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It is when merchants dispute about their own rules that they 
invoke the law.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The observation of Justice Brett holds as true today as it did in 
the nineteenth century.  During the course of contract 
negotiations, modern businesses frequently incorporate alternative 
dispute resolution (“ADR”)2 provisions into their agreements as a 
 
       †  J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2008; B.A. English, 
North Dakota State University, 1988. 
 1. Robinson v. Mollett, 7 App. Cas. 802, 817 (1875) (Brett, J., dissenting). 
 2. ABC’s of ADR: A Dispute Resolution Glossary, 10 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST 
LITIGATION 115, 115 (1992) [hereinafter Glossary].  The most prevalent forms of 
ADR are the minitrial, mediation, med-arb, and arbitration.  Id. at 115-16.  The 
1
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way to settle conflicts without court involvement.3 
One of the primary forms of ADR is arbitration.  Arbitration is 
generally described as “[a] method of dispute resolution involving 
one or more neutral third parties who are usu[ally] agreed to by 
the disputing parties and whose decision is binding.”4  Parties 
prefer arbitration because it is less costly and less formal than 
litigation.5  Additionally, arbitration offers simpler rules, more 
flexible scheduling, and less disruption of dealings between 
parties.6 
The arbitration process itself can take on a variety of forms.7  
The most common are binding arbitration and non-binding 
arbitration.8  Binding arbitration involves selection by the parties of 
a neutral person or panel of three persons to hear the dispute and 
offer a final decision or award.9  During the process, the parties 
may establish their own rules of evidence and procedure.10  Under 
binding arbitration, awards are usually enforceable by the courts 
and not subject to appeal.11  The process for non-binding 
arbitration is similar to that used in binding arbitration.12  The 
major difference is that the neutral’s conclusion is merely advisory 
and may be used by the parties for future negotiations.13 
However, inclusion of an arbitration provision in a contract 
does not guarantee the parties will use arbitration to resolve their 
 
minitrial consists of two distinct processes.  Id. at 116.  First, parties exchange 
information and have an opportunity to hear the strong and weak points of their 
case and the cases of the other parties.  Id.  An attorney for each side then presents 
an abbreviated version of the case to representatives for each side who possess 
settlement authority.  Id.  The parties may then turn to negotiation, using a 
neutral advisor if desired.  Id.  Mediation is a voluntary and less formal procedure 
where the adversarial parties choose an impartial third party to help them reach a 
settlement.  Id.  Decisions reached in mediation are not binding, but rather serve 
to facilitate the process of negotiation.  Id.  Med-arb is an abbreviation for 
mediation-arbitration.  Id.  In med-arb, the parties pursue mediation, but agree to 
arbitrate any disputes not initially settled in mediation.  Id.  For a description of 
arbitration, see text infra Part I. 
 3. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 1 (2000). 
 4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 79 (7th ed. 2000). 
 5. Glossary, supra note 2, at 115. 
 6. National Arbitration Forum, Arbitration, http://www.arbforum.com/ 
arbitration/index.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 7. Glossary, supra note 2, at 115. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
2
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dispute.  When a conflict arises over the use of arbitration, one of 
the parties will often turn to the judiciary for relief.14 
In Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
recently examined an arbitration agreement in the context of a 
broader business lease.15  A specific provision in the lease provided 
for resolution of disagreements through arbitration.16  After a 
dispute arose under the contract, the parties argued over whether 
the conflict should be resolved under the arbitration clause or in 
court.17 
Arbitration provisions are generally considered binding,18 and 
a significant body of authority exists supporting their 
enforcement.19  Minnesota courts also hold a strong presumption 
in favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate.20  However, a 
legitimate issue can be raised regarding these provisions.  If the 
 
 14. See Developments—The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1851, 1863 
(2000) [hereinafter Developments].  This type of dispute is common in business 
arrangements.  Once a conflict arises, parties often argue over whether the 
problem should be handled by an arbitrator or heard in court.  The answer 
depends on the wording of the arbitration clause, the type of dispute, and the 
jurisdiction that controls.  See infra Part II. 
 15. 669 N.W.2d 344 (2003). 
 16. Fiber Optic Lease Agreement between Onvoy, Inc. and SHAL, LLC (Oct. 
25, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Fiber Optic Lease].  See also discussion 
infra Part III (explaining terms of the lease). 
 17. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 347. 
 18. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).  Section 2 holds a written agreement to arbitrate a 
dispute involving commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  
Id.  The U.S. Code is applicable here because the dispute between Onvoy and 
SHAL is governed under federal law.  See discussion infra Part II. 
 19. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (2000); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995) (holding an arbitration award should be enforced 
“within the scope of the contract”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating “questions of arbitrability must be 
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration”); David 
L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(noting “federal policy strongly favors arbitration as an alternative dispute 
resolution process”). 
 20. Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Minn. 1995).  In 
Johnson, the supreme court noted that when considering a dispute over whether 
the parties agreed to arbitrate, Minnesota courts should resolve any questions in 
favor of arbitration “whether the problem at hand is the construction of the 
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability.”  Id. at 795 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25); see also Heyer v. 
Moldenhauer, 538 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (indicating where 
there is reasonable debate over the use of arbitration, the court should forward 
the issue to arbitration); 3 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Arbitration and Award § 1.00 (5th 
ed. 2000) (stating “[a]rbitration is a proceeding favored in the law”). 
3
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overall agreement itself does not exist, can a contract provision 
mandating arbitration still be valid?  In Onvoy, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court crafted a solution that provides a balanced answer 
to this question. 
This note first gives a brief overview of arbitration use in the 
United States.21  It then discusses the Onvoy decision22 and provides 
an analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling.23  Finally, the 
note concludes that the court’s holding properly weighs 
Minnesota’s strong presumption in favor of arbitration against the 
need to allow access to the courts.24 
II. HISTORY 
A. Background 
Many businesses now employ arbitration as a primary form of 
dispute resolution.25  Arbitration is viewed as more streamlined and 
less costly than litigation.26  Arbitration clauses are particularly 
common in commercial contracts involving construction, health 
care, entertainment, telecommunications, intellectual property, 
and technology.27  However, arbitration as a form of dispute 
resolution has existed in America since the earliest days of 
settlement.28  During both the Dutch and British colonial periods, 
merchants frequently resorted to arbitration as a faster and less 
expensive form of dispute resolution.29  Use of arbitration also 
provided a less adversarial environment that favored continuing, 
mutually beneficial business relationships.30  As early as the 
seventeenth century, businessmen in New York and Philadelphia 
 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1855. 
 26. See 70 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d § 379 (2003); Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer 
D. Henderson, Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An American Historical Review and 
a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. 
L.J. 141, 179 (2002) (arguing that arbitration costs should be reasonable and 
proportional to the amount at stake to allow access to the system). 
 27. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1855-56. 
 28. Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes 
on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 481-82 
(1995) [hereinafter Benson, Development of Arbitration]. 
 29. Id. at 481. 
 30. Id. at 482. 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/8
JOHNSON(CB & CKI).DOC 11/14/2004  6:05:34 PM 
2004] INTO THE VOID 583 
began using arbitration as commerce developed between those 
cities.31  The New York Chamber of Commerce formed the 
country’s first permanent independent board of arbitration in 
1768.32 
As the nation continued to expand, so did the use of 
arbitration.33  Mormons, as well as Chinese and Jewish immigrants, 
used arbitration instead of the courts as a response to perceived 
hostility from the broader community.34  Minnesota acknowledged 
the existence of arbitration in its earliest state laws.35 
The U.S. Supreme Court first took a favorable view toward 
arbitration in Hobson v. McArthur.36  Hobson involved a dispute over 
the appraisal of land.37  The parties agreed to use three neutral 
appraisers as arbitrators to determine the value of a specific 
property.38  When only two of the three arbitrators provided an 
estimate, the plaintiff brought suit.39  The Court stated in 
interpreting the agreement, “we must look at what was the obvious 
intention of the parties.  The parties clearly intended, that the 
valuation should, at all events, be made.”40  The fact that the third 
appraiser did not render an opinion was not sufficient to override 
the parties’ intention to arbitrate.41 
As a result, with Hobson the Court indicated arbitration 
provisions should be construed according to the intention of the 
parties.42  The ruling served notice on lower federal courts to stop 
searching for reasons to overturn arbitration awards on procedural 
grounds.43 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Burchell v. Marsh took things a 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Ed Anderson & Roger Haydock, History of Arbitration as an Alternative to 
U.S. Litigation, WEST’S LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 12, 1996, available at 1996 WL 449743 
[hereinafter Anderson & Haydock, History of Arbitration]. 
 33. Benson, Development of Arbitration, supra note 28, at 481. 
 34. 4 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 3, § 1. 
 35. MINN. STAT. ch. 96, § 1 (1851).  “All controversies which might be the 
subject of personal action at law, or of a suit in equity, may be submitted to the 
decision of one or more arbitrators in the manner provided in this chapter.”  Id. 
 36. 41 U.S. 182 (1842). 
 37. Id. at 188. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 190. 
 40. Id. at 193. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 192-93. 
 43. Benson, Development of Arbitration, supra note 28, at 485-86. 
5
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step further.44  In Burchell, a creditor sought reversal of an 
arbitration award favoring a debtor.45  The Court upheld the award: 
Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the 
matters submitted to them, finally and without appeal. As 
a mode of settling disputes, it should receive every 
encouragement from courts of equity.  If the award is 
within the submission, and contains the honest decision 
of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the 
parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, 
either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a 
substitution of the judgment of the chancellor in place of 
the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an 
award the commencement, not the end, of litigation.46 
Burchell recognized that upholding the decision of an arbitrator 
respected the parties’ intent under their contract.47 
B. Modern Application 
 Congress formally recognized arbitration when it passed the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925.48  Prior to passage of the 
FAA, Federal courts had acknowledged arbitration agreements as 
an option, but viewed them as having no real force under the law.49  
Parties who wished to avoid agreements to arbitrate needed to 
merely refuse to proceed under the agreement, as courts would 
generally not order specific performance of the contract.50  
Additionally, the party obtaining an award under an arbitration 
clause was by no means guaranteed to receive it.51  The losing party 
would often contest the award in court through protracted 
litigation.52  Furthermore, courts in the United States continued to 
show reluctance toward private dispute resolution, even if the 
 
 44. 58 U.S. 344 (1854). 
 45. Id. at 346. 
 46. Id. at 349. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).  “The FAA was Congress’ response to the 
reluctance of federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements.”  Andre V. Egle, 
Back to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Manufacturing Co.: To Challenge an 
Arbitration Agreement You Must Challenge the Arbitration Agreement, 78 WASH. L. REV. 
199, 199 (2003). 
 49. Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. 
L. REV. 265, 270 (1926) [hereinafter Cohen & Dayton, New Arbitration Law]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 271. 
6
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parties had agreed on that course.53  That all changed with passage 
of the FAA.  The new law “reversed the hoary doctrine that 
agreements for arbitration are revocable at will and are 
unenforceable.”54  The FAA solidified the validity of arbitration 
provisions and “place[d] arbitration agreements on par with other 
contracts.”55 
Also in the 1920s, several states passed arbitration statutes at 
the urging of arbitration groups and bar associations.56  
Interestingly, attorneys advocated passage of the laws in order to 
provide a place for themselves in the ADR process.57  Many feared 
increasing use of arbitration would exclude them from their 
traditional dispute resolution activities, which would lead to 
reduced income.58  Tailoring arbitration laws to facilitate attorney 
involvement guaranteed their continuing inclusion in the system.59  
In addition to encouraging attorney participation, the new statutes 
directed courts to recognize the validity of arbitration agreements 
and arbitration awards.60  Minnesota followed this trend by 
adopting the Minnesota Arbitration Act (“MAA”) in 1957.61  Similar 
to the FAA, the MAA strongly advocates the use and validity of 
arbitration agreements.62 
With the development of arbitration statutes by so many 
jurisdictions, conflict between state and federal arbitration laws was 
inevitable.  The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating.63  In Southland, several 7-11 franchisees 
 
 53. Anderson & Haydock, History of Arbitration, supra note 32. 
 54. Cohen & Dayton, New Arbitration Law, supra note 49, at 265. 
 55. Anderson & Haydock, History of Arbitration, supra note 32. 
 56. Benson, Development of Arbitration, supra note 28, at 481.  The states 
included New York (1920), New Jersey (1923), Oregon (1925), Massachusetts 
(1925), Pennsylvania (1927), and California (1927).  Id.  Congress’ final version of 
the FAA nearly mirrors the New York and New Jersey arbitration statutes.  Cohen 
& Dayton, New Arbitration Law, supra note 49, at 269. 
 57. Benson, Development of Arbitration, supra note 28, at 491-92. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 497. 
 61. MINN. STAT. § 572.08 (2002). 
 62. Id.  The MAA states,  
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or 
a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy 
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
Id. 
 63. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
7
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brought an action for fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of 
contract against their franchisor.64  The California Supreme Court 
held the franchisees’ claims could be heard under state arbitration 
law.65  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, and stated the FAA was 
controlling and served to preempt state laws that attempt to limit 
enforcement of arbitration provisions.66 
Nevertheless, a number of states continued to overlook 
Southland and apply their own laws to arbitration disputes.67  Many 
jurisdictions looked to a loophole distinction of language in 
contracts either “involving” or “affecting” interstate commerce.68  
Inevitably, the Supreme Court provided the definitive jurisdictional 
solution in the 1995 case Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.69  In 
Terminix, a homeowner sued an extermination company for 
inadequate termite removal and damage repair under their service 
contract.70  The exterminator invoked the contract’s arbitration 
clause, and asked for a stay to allow arbitration to proceed under 
Section 2 of the FAA.71  The lower court denied the stay, and the 
Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial.72  The supreme court 
reasoned the FAA only would apply if the parties, at the time of 
contract formation, “‘contemplated substantial interstate activity.’”73  
 
 64. Id. at 1. 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. Id. at 15-16.  In its opinion, the Court noted, 
[t]he interpretation given to the [Federal] Arbitration Act by the 
California Supreme Court would therefore encourage and reward forum 
shopping. We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the intent, in 
drawing on the comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to 
create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the right 
dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in which it is 
asserted. And since the overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation in 
this country is in the state courts, we cannot believe Congress intended to 
limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal-court 
jurisdiction.  Such an interpretation would frustrate congressional intent 
to place “[an] arbitration agreement . . . upon the same footing as other 
contracts, where it belongs.” 
Id. at 15 (internal citation omitted). 
 67. See discussion infra Parts II-III. 
 68. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 69. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 70. Id. at 268-69. 
 71. Id. at 269. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354, 355 
(Ala. 1993) (quoting Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 
F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961)), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 1190 (1994), rev’d by 513 U.S. 
265 (1995)). 
8
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While Terminix was a multi-state firm, the court felt the parties 
anticipated a local and not an interstate transaction.74  The U.S. 
Supreme Court disagreed.  In its decision, the Supreme Court 
effectively preempted state law by holding the FAA applied to all 
transactions involving or affecting interstate commerce, regardless 
of whether the parties contemplated interstate commerce at 
contract formation.75  From that point on, the FAA would govern 
any arbitration agreements relating to interstate commerce 
transactions throughout all fifty states.76 
A major issue that occurs in arbitration cases is interpretation 
of the arbitration clause as it relates to contract formation.  Parties 
frequently clash over whether arbitration language aimed at 
resolving disputes “arising under” the agreement can be used to 
arbitrate questions regarding formation of the agreement itself.  
Several courts have stated the wording is in fact broad enough to 
 
 74. Terminix, 513 U.S. at 269. 
 75. Id. at 273-74.  Specifically, the Court stated: 
[W]e conclude that the word “involving” is broad and is indeed the 
functional equivalent of “affecting.”  For one thing, such an 
interpretation, linguistically speaking, is permissible.  The dictionary 
finds instances in which “involve” and “affect” sometimes can mean about 
the same thing.  For another, the [FAA]'s legislative history, to the extent 
that it is informative, indicates an expansive congressional intent. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
The Court continued with: 
[A] broad interpretation of this language is consistent with the Act’s 
basic purpose, to put arbitration provisions on “the same footing” as a 
contract's other terms.  Conversely, a narrower interpretation is not 
consistent with the [FAA]'s purpose, for (unless unreasonably narrowed 
to the flow of commerce) such an interpretation would create a new, 
unfamiliar test lying somewhere in a no man's land between “in 
commerce” and “affecting commerce,” thereby unnecessarily 
complicating the law and breeding litigation from a statute that seeks to 
avoid it. 
Id. at 275 (internal citation omitted).  The Court had previously taken the position 
that states were required to apply the FAA when state law conflicted with federal 
law.  See Southland discussion supra Part II.  Many states disagreed with Southland, 
and in an effort to preserve state arbitration laws and limit the reach of the FAA, 
twenty state attorneys general joined respondent’s request to overturn the 
Southland decision in Terminix.  Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272; Bryan L. Quick, 
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corporation: Is the Montana Supreme Court 
Undermining the Federal Arbitration Act?, 63 MONT. L. REV. 445, 454 (2002). 
 76. Despite the Terminix ruling, both the district court and the court of 
appeals applied state law in reaching their decisions concerning the dispute 
between Onvoy and SHAL.  Onvoy, Inc., v. SHAL, LLC, Nos. C7-02-621, C7-02-702, 
2002 WL 31371961 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2002), rev’d, 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 
2003); see discussion infra note 132. 
9
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cover formation issues.77  For example, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 
a manufacturer and a business owner entered into an agreement 
for the purchase of three business enterprises and their associated 
trademarks.78  The parties then argued over whether their dispute 
involving an attempt to rescind the contract due to fraud should be 
heard in court or under the arbitration clause.79  The Supreme 
Court determined the arbitration clause encompassed questions of 
formation.80  The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
Battaglia v. McKendry.81  In Battaglia, a conflict arose between family 
members concerning settlement of a trust.82  Specifically, the 
parties disputed whether the arbitration provision contained in a 
settlement agreement was broad enough to cover questions 
concerning formation of the underlying agreement itself.83  Again, 
the court determined the arbitration clause could address contract 
formation.84 
C. The Prima Paint Doctrine 
Another issue can arise when one party seeks to use the courts 
instead of an existing arbitration agreement to settle a dispute.  
The most prominent example of this occurred in Prima Paint Corp. 
v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.85  In Prima Paint, two 
corporations from different states entered into a consulting 
agreement.86  The consulting agreement contained an arbitration 
clause.87  After a year of operating under the contract, Prima Paint 
 
 77. See cases cited infra notes 78, 81. 
 78. 417 U.S. 506, 507 (1974). 
 79. Id at 506. 
 80. Id. at 519-20.  The Court stated, “[W]e hold that the agreement of the 
parties in this case to arbitrate any dispute arising out of their international 
commercial transaction is to be respected and enforced by the federal courts in 
accord with the explicit provisions of the [Federal] Arbitration Act.”  Id. 
 81. 233 F.3d 720 (2000). 
 82. Id. at 722-23. 
 83. Id. at 722. 
 84. Id. at 727.  The court stated inclusion of phrases such as “arising under” 
and “arising out of” in arbitration provisions should be allowed “broad 
construction, and are generally construed to encompass claims going to the 
formation of the underlying agreements.”  Id. 
 85. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 86. Id. at 396. 
 87. Id. at 398.  The clause stated “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or 
relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration” 
in New York City and “in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the 
American Arbitration Association . . . .”  Id. 
10
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contended that F & C had breached their agreement when Prima 
Paint discovered that F & C intended to file bankruptcy.88  Prima 
Paint brought suit against F & C, alleging it had misrepresented its 
solvency, which in turn fraudulently induced Prima Paint to enter 
into the contract.89 
The case was originally heard in U.S. District Court.90  
Concurrent with filing of its complaint, Prima Paint also petitioned 
the district court for an order enjoining F & C from proceeding to 
arbitration.91  F & C filed a countermotion asking the court to stay 
proceedings pending arbitration.92  The court granted F & C’s 
motion, and held a charge of fraud in the inducement of a contract 
containing such a broad arbitration clause should be heard by an 
arbitrator, not the court.93  Prima Paint appealed.  The court of 
appeals affirmed, and indicated a claim of fraud in the inducement 
of the contract generally, as opposed to the arbitration clause 
specifically, should be heard by arbitrators, not the courts.94  The 
court reasoned arbitration clauses are severable from the rest of the 
contract.95  After considering the evidence, the Supreme Court 
affirmed.96 
The major impact of the Court’s ruling in Prima Paint came in 
its reinforcement of the idea that arbitration clauses are severable 
from the rest of the contract under the FAA.97  In considering the 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 262 F. Supp. 605 
(D.C.N.Y. 1966). 
 91. Id. at 607. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 
1966). 
 95. Id.  The court of appeals looked to the decision in Robert Lawrence Co. v. 
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 
(1960), in which it was noted: 
[t]hat the Arbitration Act envisages a distinction between the entire 
contract between the parties on the one hand and the arbitration clause 
of the contract on the other is plain on the fact of the statute. Section 2 
does not purport to affect the contract as a whole. On the contrary, it 
makes “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” only a “written provision in 
any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction . . . .” 
Id. at 409-10. 
 96. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967). 
 97. Id. at 403-04. 
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terms of the FAA, the Court stated: 
Under § 4, with respect to a matter within the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts save for the existence of an 
arbitration clause, the federal court is instructed to order 
arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that “the making 
of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply 
(with the arbitration agreement) is not in issue.”  
Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the 
arbitration clause itself—an issue which goes to the 
“making” of the agreement to arbitrate—the federal court 
may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language 
does not permit the federal court to consider claims of 
fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.98 
Continuing with its opinion, the Court indicated, “[w]e hold, 
therefore, that in passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while the 
parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues relating to 
the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”99 
As a result, in order to bypass an arbitration agreement and 
have a dispute heard in court, the party seeking court intervention 
must allege a problem with the arbitration provision itself, not the 
underlying contract.100  This idea has become known as the “Prima 
Paint doctrine.”101 
III. THE ONVOY DECISION 
A. Facts 
Onvoy, Inc. (“Onvoy”) is a privately held Minnesota 
telecommunications company.102  It was founded in 1988 by sixty-
five local telephone providers for the purpose of supplying better 
access to long distance service.103  SHAL, LLC (“SHAL”) is a 
Minnesota company comprised of three local telephone service 
providers who are each shareholders in Onvoy.104  SHAL builds and 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 404. 
 100. Id. at 403-04. 
 101. See, e.g., Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 100 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“[T]he arbitration clause is severable from the contested agreement under the 
doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co.”). 
 102. Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 347-48 (Minn. 2003). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 348. 
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maintains fiber optic telecommunications transport systems, 
primarily for SHAL companies.105  SHAL is also a “segment 
provider” for Onvoy.106  Segment providers supply one portion of 
the transmission capacity Onvoy needs to route long distance traffic 
from local providers to Onvoy.107 
In May 1999, Onvoy sought bids from fifty local telephone 
providers for a new fiber optic network running from Plymouth to 
Moorhead, Minnesota.108  For cost purposes, Onvoy planned to 
lease the network rather than constructing and owning it.109  Along 
with two other segment providers, SHAL submitted a bid for 
Onvoy’s project.110 
The deep interconnection between Onvoy and SHAL was 
evident during formation of the deal.  Three of the defendants, 
who were also respondents in this case, served on boards or 
committees at both companies, and were active in the negotiation 
of the agreement at issue.111  Walter Clay served on both the boards 
of directors at Onvoy and SHAL, and served on the Finance and 
Audit Committee at Onvoy.112  Robert Eddy served on both 
companies’ boards of directors, as well as Onvoy’s Network 
Committee.113  SHAL employee Darrell Westrum served on Onvoy’s 
Network Committee, as did Tom Dahl, the general manager of one 
of SHAL’s member service providers.114 
During its negotiations with SHAL, Onvoy sought outside 
investors for the project.115  In September 1999, two investment 
companies of financier George Soros purchased 50,000 shares of 
Onvoy stock for $50,000,000.116  As a result, Onvoy amended its 
articles of incorporation to allow the Soros shareholders to elect 
three Onvoy board members.117  Under the amended articles, at 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 28, Onvoy (Nos. C7-02-621, C7-02-702).  The other two 
bidders, Val-Ed Joint Venture, LLP, and Central Transport Group, LLC, were also 
shareholders in Onvoy.  Pl. Am. Compl. at ¶ 16. 
 111. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 348. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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least one of the Soros directors would have to approve transactions 
that involved contracting with an affiliate or entering or amending 
any material contract.118 
In October 1999, Onvoy and SHAL executed a ten-year lease 
for construction and use of the fiber optic network.119  The lease 
contained the following provision: 
Mediation and Arbitration.  Any unresolved disputes arising 
under this Lease shall first be submitted to mediation.  
Unless the dispute is resolved after consultation between 
the liaisons of each party, a mediator shall be selected by 
agreement of the chief operation officers of each party.  
In the event that a dispute cannot be resolved by 
mediation, then the parties agree that the dispute shall be 
submitted to arbitration under the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association.120 
In November 2001, Onvoy sought rescission of the lease, 
claiming it was several times more expensive than the going market 
price.121  Onvoy also claimed that defendants Clay, Eddy, Westrum, 
and Dahl breached their fiduciary duties.122  Furthermore, Onvoy 
alleged that the defendants made material misrepresentations to 
induce Onvoy to enter the lease, as well as negligently 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Fiber Optic Lease, supra note 16.  SHAL argued the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) should govern the arbitrability question under 
the terms of the contract.  Respondent’s Brief at 5, Onvoy (Nos. C7-02-621 & C7-02-
702).  SHAL pointed out under AAA Rule R-8(b): 
[T]he arbitrator shall have the power to determine the existence or 
validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part.  Such an 
arbitration clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the 
other terms of the contract.  A decision by the arbitrator that the contract 
is null and void shall not for that reason alone render invalid the 
arbitration clause. 
Id.  The Onvoy court did not accept this argument.  669 N.W. 2d at 354; see also 
discussion infra Part III. 
 121. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 349.  In its Amended Complaint, Onvoy alleged, 
[t]he decisions and assumptions utilized in creating the benchmark cost 
resulted in overly high lease prices for the benefit of defendants, not 
Onvoy.  The formula imposes on Onvoy the costs of ownership but does 
not give the benefit of ownership.  Onvoy bore 100% of the cost of 
construction despite the fact that the lessors installed some of their own 
fibers and despite the fact that if Onvoy had constructed the facilities 
itself, it would not have done so without at least one partner to share the 
costs of construction with. 
Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 35(d). 
 122. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 349. 
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misrepresented the lease terms and the bidding process.123  In 
support of its position, Onvoy argued that the parties never formed 
an agreement because the actions of SHAL and its representatives 
constituted a prohibited interested-director124 and ultra vires 
transaction.125 
An interested-director transaction is a form of conflict of 
interest.126  A director is usually prohibited from “representing both 
himself and his principal in a transaction in which their interests 
are adverse and antagonistic.”127  In Minnesota, courts can review a 
transaction if one party claims the other did not act in a “fair and 
reasonable” manner.128 
Ultra vires transactions are usually deemed invalid if they 
exceed the corporation’s authority to make an agreement.129  
However, an ultra vires transaction could be considered valid if it is 
within the power of the corporation, even though the transaction 
itself may be irregular or unauthorized.130 
B. The Court’s Analysis 
Appellate courts’ standard of review for arbitrability questions 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. An interested director is one involved in a corporate transaction where he 
or she may have a personal interest.  See Possis v. Cont’l Machs., Inc., 425 N.W.2d 
286, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 125. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1235 (7th ed. 2000) (defining an “ultra vires 
transaction” as one that is “[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or 
granted by a corporate charter . . . .”).  Onvoy claimed an improperly constituted 
board approved the transaction with SHAL.  Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 349. 
 126. In general, 
a director may not pursue his own interests in a manner that is injurious 
to the corporation. Directors must use the authority given them solely for 
the benefit of the corporation and its stockholders and may not enter 
into contracts that will bargain away the independent judgment that they 
are bound to exercise in the interest of the corporation and all of the 
stockholders. Directors owe stockholders an active duty of honesty and 
good faith in the transaction of the business of the corporation and in 
their dealings with it. 
9 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Corporations § 7.09 (5th ed. 2003). 
 127. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1732 (2000).  Overall, a director does not 
have the right to work on behalf of the corporation in any transaction “in which 
he is . . . interested in obtaining any advantage at the expense of the corporation, 
and he cannot act as or for an adverse party to the transaction.”  Id. 
 128. MINN. STAT. § 302A.255 (2002); see also  discussion infra Part III.B. 
 129. 9 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Corporations § 6.00 (5th ed. 2003). 
 130. Id. 
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is de novo.131  The Minnesota Supreme Court examined the issues 
and determined that the FAA applied because the case involved 
interstate commerce.132  The court then addressed whether Onvoy’s 
claims would make the lease void or merely voidable.133  A void 
contract is not a contract at all; instead it is a “promise” or 
“agreement” that is void of legal effect.134  A voidable contract is 
generally valid, but one of the parties has the power to avoid the 
agreement due to incapacity, breach of warranty, or fraud, duress, 
or mistake at formation.135 
SHAL argued that, under the Prima Paint doctrine, questions 
of contract validity could only be addressed by courts if they dealt 
with the arbitration clause itself, not the entire agreement.136  SHAL 
pointed out that neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit 
had adopted a distinction between void and voidable contracts, and 
therefore neither should the Minnesota Supreme Court.137  The 
court disagreed, and stated that the question of whether a valid 
lease ever existed could be heard by a court and was sufficient to 
 
 131. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 88 v. Sch. Serv. Employees Union Local 284, 503 
N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn. 1993) (“[T]his court's review of the determination of 
arbitrability is de novo.”). 
 132. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 350-351.  The court cited Terminix in its reasoning.  
Id. at 351.  Onvoy affected two Minnesota cases used by the lower courts: Atcas v. 
Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972), and Thayer v. Am. 
Fin. Advisers, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. 1982).  Atcas held (1) a party would not 
be compelled to arbitrate if the arbitration clause did not cover fraud in the 
inducement, and (2) arbitration was not proper when one party sought recission 
of the contract.  292 Minn. at 347-48, 197 N.W.2d at 456.  Thayer stated federal law 
did not encompass the contract at issue, because the language of the FAA applied 
only to transactions “involving” and not “affecting” commerce.  322 N.W.2d at 603-
04.  Onvoy overruled Atcas to the extent it conflicted with Terminix.  Onvoy, 669 
N.W.2d at 351.  Onvoy also vacated Thayer, because the Supreme Court in Terminix 
had removed the involving/affecting distinction and stated the FAA applied to all 
transactions in any way related to interstate commerce.  Id.; see also text supra Part 
II (explaining Terminix decision). 
 133. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 353-55. 
 134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. a (1981). 
 135. Id. cmt. b. 
 136. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 352-53 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)); see also discussion supra Part II.C 
(describing the Supreme Court ruling in Prima Paint). 
 137. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 353.  The court stated it had previously considered 
the void/voidable distinction under Minnesota law.  Id.  In Dvorak v. Maring, the 
court indicated it had held on numerous occasions that “without the signatures of 
both spouses a conveyance of homestead property is not merely voidable but is 
void and the buyer acquires no rights whatsoever.”  285 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Minn. 
1979). 
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override the arbitration clause.138  Specifically, the court held 
“parties may not be compelled to arbitrate claims if they have 
alleged that the contract at issue never legally existed.”139  The court 
further indicated, “allegations that a contract is void may be heard 
by a court, even if not specifically directed to the arbitration clause, 
while allegations that a contract is voidable must be sent to 
arbitration.”140 
After resolving this issue, the supreme court turned to Onvoy’s 
specific claims.  The court determined SHAL’s actions did not rise 
to the level of an ultra vires transaction.141  Minnesota recognizes an 
ultra vires transaction as one within the corporation’s powers, but 
with “some irregularity or defect in the actual exercise of power.”142  
Onvoy claimed it did not properly approve the lease because a 
majority of the Onvoy board and one of the Soros directors did not 
vote on the transaction, thus making it ultra vires.143  However, 
Minnesota law would presume the contract valid,144 even if Onvoy 
approved the transaction with an improperly constituted board.145  
The court held the board’s actions would at most make the lease 
voidable, not void.146  A voidable lease would be subject to 
arbitration under the arbitration clause; a void lease would require 
court involvement because no lease or arbitration clause would 
exist.147  As a result, the court ruled Onvoy’s claim would be subject 
 
 138. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 354. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  The court based its decision on Sandvik AB v. Advent International 
Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107-08 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[N]o arbitration may be compelled in 
the absence of an agreement to arbitrate.”); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.2 
(explaining the Sandvik decision). 
 141. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 355. 
 142. Bell v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 213, 219, 133 N.W. 271, 273 (1907).  Bell 
outlined two types of ultra vires transactions.  Id. at 218, 113 N.W. at 273.  The first 
type involved “a contract which is not within the scope of the powers of a 
corporation to make under any circumstances, or for any purposes.”  Id.  The 
second type related to contracts within the powers of the corporation, but with 
some problem or flaw in the use of the corporation’s power.  Id. at 219, 113 N.W. 
at 273.  The supreme court in Onvoy felt the dispute between the parties most 
closely resembled the second type of ultra vires transaction.  669 N.W.2d at 355. 
 143. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 354; see also supra Part III.A (describing 
configuration of the board). 
 144. “The . . . performing by a corporation of an act . . . if otherwise lawful, is 
not invalid because the corporations was without the power to . . . perform the 
act.”  MINN. STAT. § 302A.165 (2002). 
 145. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 355. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 354. 
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to arbitration under the ultra vires theory.148 
Regarding the interested-director transaction, the court noted 
the burden was on SHAL to show the lease was not void from 
inception.149  Under Minnesota law, SHAL would need to offer 
proof it satisfied one of four safe harbor provisions to demonstrate 
the transaction was in fact valid and not void as an interested-
director transaction.150  The Onvoy court indicated in order to prove 
the lease was valid, SHAL must show one of the following: 
(1) that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the 
corporation at the time it was approved; (2) that material 
facts about the contract and the directors’ interest were 
fully disclosed and the contract was approved in good 
faith by at least two-thirds of the disinterested corporate 
shareholders; (3) that material facts about the contract 
and the directors’ conflicts were known by a board or 
committee who authorized the transaction without the 
vote of interested directors; or (4) that the contract is a 
distribution, merger, or exchange.151 
If SHAL succeeded in showing the agreement met one of the 
safe harbor provisions, Onvoy’s claims would be sent to 
arbitration.152  If SHAL failed, the lease would be considered void, 
and Onvoy would be allowed to litigate.153  The court remanded 
this question to the district court for further consideration.154 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ONVOY DECISION 
A. Conflicting Views of the Circuits 
Two opposing schools of thought exist regarding application 
of the Prima Paint doctrine.  Federal circuits are split over whether 
the question of contract formation invalidates an arbitration clause 
contained in the disputed agreement.155  Understandably, the 
parties in Onvoy took opposite positions on this issue. 
The crux of the conflict between Onvoy and SHAL hinges on 
 
 148. Id. at 355. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.255 (2002). 
 151. 669 N.W.2d at 355-56. 
 152. Id. at 356. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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the distinction between void and voidable contracts.  SHAL, in 
following Prima Paint, argued the arbitration provision contained in 
the disputed contract applied in resolving the conflict.156  Under 
SHAL’s theory, the overall contract would be viewed as voidable.157  
A voidable contract allows one of the parties to rescind the 
agreement due to fraud, duress, or mistake at contract formation.158  
Disputes under a voidable contract remain subject to arbitration, 
however, because the existing contract, not the valid arbitration 
provision contained in the contract, would be the focus of 
debate.159 
Conversely, the decisions favoring Onvoy’s position reflect a 
modified approach to Prima Paint.  In those cases, questions of 
whether a contract was void would also affect the validity of the 
arbitration provision.160  Under this theory, if no contract exists, 
neither does the arbitration clause contained in the contract.161  
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered both positions in 
reaching its decision in Onvoy. 
1. Circuits Following Prima Paint 
Many courts consider the concept of severability of arbitration 
clauses controlling over disputes involving arbitration 
agreements.162  Prima Paint represents the primary reasoning 
behind this philosophy: unless specifically challenged on its own, 
the arbitration provision will control in any contract dispute.163 
Several federal circuits follow this reasoning and have ruled 
accordingly.164  For example, the Fifth Circuit examined the 
 
 156. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 352-53. 
 157. Id. at 353-54. 
 158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 134, at cmt. b. 
 159. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 353-54. 
 160. See cases discussed infra Part IV.A.2. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See cases cited infra Part IV.A.1 and note 164. 
 163. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 
(1967). 
 164. See text infra Part IV.A.1; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Courtney 
Enters, 270 F.3d 621, 624-25 (8th Cir. 2001) (“In deciding whether to compel 
arbitration,” Prima Paint directs courts to “consider whether there was fraud in the 
inducement of the arbitration clause” but not the “underlying contract.”); Ferro 
Corp. v. Garrison Indus., 142 F.3d 926, 933 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that, under 
Prima Paint, once the court determines “the agreement to arbitrate has not been 
fraudulently induced, all other issues falling within that agreement are to be sent 
to arbitration”); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 
1996) (“Because [plaintiff’s] claim relates to the entire agreement, rather than just 
19
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enforceability of an arbitration clause in Robert Lawrence v. 
Comprehensive Business Services Co.165  Plaintiff Lawrence purchased a 
license allowing him to use the name of defendant Comprehensive, 
an accounting service.166  The franchise agreement contained an 
arbitration clause.167  After execution of the contract, Lawrence 
found out the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy had taken 
action against other Comprehensive franchisees for operating an 
accounting business under a trade name.168  In fear of losing his 
license, Lawrence informed Comprehensive he could no longer 
perform under their franchise agreement.169  Lawrence then 
brought suit to have the contract rescinded, claiming it was illegal 
under Texas law.170  Comprehensive brought a motion to stay 
litigation and compel arbitration under terms of the franchise 
agreement.171  The district court ruled for Comprehensive and 
Lawrence appealed.172  The court of appeals affirmed, indicating 
the arbitration provision was binding despite Lawrence’s claim the 
underlying contract was illegal.173  The court also reinforced Prima 
Paint, and stated any challenges to arbitration must be directed at 
the legality of the arbitration provision itself, not the contract as a 
 
the arbitration clause, the FAA requires that her claims be heard by an 
arbitrator.”); R.M. Perez & Assoc., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(“If the fraud relates to the arbitration clause itself, the court should adjudicate 
the fraud claim.”  However, if the fraud claim “relates to the entire agreement, 
then the Federal Arbitration Act requires that the fraud claim be decided by an 
arbitrator.”); C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 
Sec. Corp., 912 F.2d 1563, 1567 (6th Cir. 1990) (Prima Paint mandates “[i]f the 
arbitration clause is not at issue, then the arbitrator will decide challenges to the 
contract containing the arbitration clause.”); Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71, 75 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (holding when a party alleges defects in formation of a contract 
containing an arbitration provision, and the “alleged defects pertain to the entire 
contract, rather than specifically to the arbitration clause, they are properly left to 
the arbitrator for resolution”). 
 165. 833 F.2d 1159 (1987). 
 166. Id. at 1160. 
 167. Id. at 1161. 
 168. Id. at 1160. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1161. 
 171. Id.  The arbitration provision provided in part “[a]ny controversy arising 
out of, or relating to, this agreement . . . including any claim for damages or 
rescission . . . shall be settled by arbitration . . . .”  Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1162; see also Mesa Operating Ltd. P’ship v. La. Intrastate Gas Corp., 
797 F.2d 238, 244 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding arbitration clause in gas sales contract 
enforceable despite claim contract was void from inception due to parties’ failure 
to follow state law concerning such sales). 
20
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whole.174 
The Sixth Circuit also examined this issue in Burden v. Check 
Into Cash of Kentucky, LLC.175  Burden involved an action by a 
bankruptcy trustee for three estates against a creditor of those 
estates.176  Plaintiffs in Burden claimed the defendant, under the 
guise of a check-cashing company, loaned money at usurious rates 
in violation of federal and state law.177  Under the scheme, 
customers would provide the company with a check for a specified 
amount.178  The company would then give the customer a sum of 
cash less than the amount of the check.179  The company kept the 
difference as a “service fee” or “finance charge.”180  The transaction 
required customers to execute a “loan agreement,” indicating the 
customer would pay back the cash to the company in two weeks.181  
The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause.182 
After plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy, their trustee brought this 
action.183  When plaintiffs sought class certification, defendant 
moved to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims and stay litigation 
pending arbitration.184  The district court denied defendant’s 
motion, and defendant appealed.185  The court of appeals vacated 
the district court’s decision, and remanded on the question of 
arbitrability.186  In explaining its decision, the court noted under 
Prima Paint, a dispute over fraud in the inducement of the entire 
contract is for an arbitrator, not a court, to decide.187 
 
 174. Robert Lawrence, 833 F.2d at 1162. 
 175. 267 F.3d 483 (2001). 
 176. Id. at 486. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 487.  The arbitration clause stated, 
To pursue any claim, demand, dispute or cause of action . . . arising 
under this Agreement or the transaction in connection with which this 
Agreement has been executed, the claimant must submit to the other 
party in writing an explanation of the claim and a demand that the claim 
be resolved by arbitration. 
Id. 
 183. Id. at 486. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 485-86. 
 187. Id. at 491.  Specifically, the court indicated, “a challenge based on fraud 
in the inducement of the whole contract (including the arbitration clause) is for 
the arbitrator, while a challenge based on the lack of mutuality of the arbitration 
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The Fourth Circuit followed a similar course in Snowden v. 
CheckPoint Check Cashing.188  In circumstances that paralleled Burden, 
Snowden, the plaintiff, executed several “deferred deposit” 
transactions with defendant check-cashing company.189  The 
defendant provided cash to plaintiff, with the understanding 
plaintiff’s check would not be negotiated until a later date.190  One 
of the agreements memorializing a specific deferred deposit 
transaction contained an arbitration provision.191  Snowden later 
brought suit against CheckPoint, claiming its deferred deposit 
transactions were in fact loans that violated state and federal 
statutes.192  CheckPoint moved to compel arbitration and stay any 
court proceedings.193  The district court denied the motion, and 
CheckPoint appealed.194  The court of appeals vacated the district 
court decision and remanded for further proceedings.195  In a 
reference to Prima Paint, the court indicated a party seeking to 
avoid or stay arbitration must challenge the arbitration clause itself, 
not the underlying contract.196 
2. Circuits Taking a Modified Approach 
Despite other jurisdictions’ decisions to the contrary, certain 
federal circuits have taken a modified approach to Prima Paint.  
Those circuits allow a court to decide the fundamental issue of 
whether the parties ever formed a binding contract, even if the 
contract at issue contains an arbitration provision.197  Under this 
 
clause would be for the court.”  Id. (quoting Matterhorn v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 
866, 868 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
 188. 290 F.3d 631 (2002). 
 189. Id. at 633. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 634. 
 193. Id. at 635. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 637, 639. 
 196. Id. at 636.  In its decision, the court noted, 
The law is well settled in this circuit that, if a party seeks to avoid 
arbitration and/or a stay of federal court proceedings pending the 
outcome of arbitration by challenging the validity or enforceability of an 
arbitration provision on any grounds that “exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract” [under 9 U.S.C. § 2], the grounds “must 
relate specifically to the arbitration clause and not just to the contract as 
a whole.” 
Id. (quoting Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 197. See cases cited infra Part IV.2; see also Camping Constr. Co. v. Dist. Council 
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approach, challenging the existence of the overall contract would 
also bring the arbitration clause into question. 
The Ninth Circuit issued one of the most prominent decisions 
on this issue in Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton & 
Company, Inc.198  Plaintiffs in Three Valleys were comprised of several 
governmental entities.199  Plaintiffs opened trading accounts with 
defendant E.F. Hutton, a securities investment firm.200  As part of 
the transaction, the parties executed a client agreement that 
contained an arbitration clause.201  Two years after opening the 
accounts, plaintiffs brought suit against Hutton, claiming 
investment losses due to Hutton’s wrongful conduct.202  Hutton 
filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay court proceedings.203  
Plaintiffs opposed the motion to compel and argued the client 
agreement with Hutton was void because the signatory did not have 
the power to bind plaintiffs.204  The district court ruled the question 
of whether the signatory had authority should be decided by an 
arbitrator, not the court.205  The court of appeals reversed.206  
Hutton had argued Prima Paint applied to the making of the entire 
contract, not just the agreement to arbitrate.207  The court of 
appeals disagreed, and interpreted Prima Paint as restricted to 
“challenges seeking to avoid or rescind a contract—not to challenges 
going to the very existence of a contract” that one of the parties 
“claims never to have agreed to.”208  Consequently, the court held 
 
of Iron Workers, 915 F.2d 1333, 1340 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating “[t]he court must 
determine whether a contract ever existed;” otherwise, “there is no basis for 
submitting any question to an arbitrator”); Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge 
Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54-55 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding a trial is warranted “to 
determine whether or not an agreement was reached and, if so, whether said 
agreement properly included an agreement to arbitrate”); Interocean Shipping 
Co. v. Nat’l Shipping and Trading Corp., 462 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(indicating “if the making of the [contract] was in issue . . . the district court 
should have proceeded to trial of this question” before compelling arbitration). 
 198. 925 F.2d 1136 (1991). 
 199. Id. at 1137. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1138.  The arbitration clause provided “all controversies which may 
arise between us concerning any transaction or . . . performance or breach of this . 
. . agreement between us . . . shall be determined by arbitration.”  Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 1137. 
 207. Id. at 1140. 
 208. Id. 
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the party contesting the existence of a contract containing an 
arbitration clause “cannot be compelled to arbitrate the threshold 
issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate” because “[o]nly a 
court can make that decision.”209 
The Third Circuit provided another significant decision on the 
arbitrability issue in Sandvik AB v. Advent International Corp.210  
Sandvik involved an attempt by an American equity investment firm 
to purchase subsidiaries of a Swedish manufacturing company.211  
The parties executed a sales agreement that included an 
arbitration provision.212  When the equity firm, Advent, indicated it 
did not see itself as bound by the agreement, the manufacturer, 
Sandvik, sued for fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of 
contract.213  Advent then moved to compel arbitration, arguing that 
under the Prima Paint doctrine, the arbitration clause contained in 
the sales agreement was severable from the rest of the contract.214  
Sandvik asserted it could not be forced into arbitration if no 
agreement to arbitrate existed.215  The district court agreed with 
Sandvik, and the court of appeals affirmed.216  In its holding, the 
court indicated “no arbitration may be compelled in the absence of 
an agreement to arbitrate.”217 
The Second Circuit also examined the question of arbitrability 
under a group of disputed contracts in Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v. 
Clarendon National Insurance Co.218  Plaintiff, a reinsurer, and 
defendant, an insurance carrier, executed six reinsurance 
agreements through their agents.219  The reinsurance agreements 
contained arbitration clauses that provided for arbitration of 
disputes.220  Sphere Drake became unhappy with the terms of the 
contracts and brought a declaratory judgment action.221  To avoid 
 
 209. Id. at 1140-41. 
 210. 220 F.3d 99 (2000). 
 211. Id. at 100. 
 212. Id. at 101.  The arbitration provision dictated mandatory arbitration for 
“[a]ny dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement . . . .”  Id. 
 213. Id. at 101-02. 
 214. Id. at 100-01. 
 215. Id. at 101. 
 216. Id. at 100-01. 
 217. Id. at 107-08. 
 218. 263 F.3d 26 (2001). 
 219. Id. at 28. 
 220. Id.  The arbitration clause in each contract provided, “[d]isputes between 
the parties arising out of this Reinsurance which cannot be resolved by 
compromise . . . shall be submitted to arbitration.”  Id. 
 221. Id. at 27-28. 
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arbitration, Sphere Drake asked the district court to declare the 
agreements void because its agent had exceeded his authority.222  
The district court held the dispute was subject to the contracts’ 
arbitration clauses because, under Prima Paint, a party seeking to 
avoid arbitration must allege a problem with an arbitration clause 
specifically, not the overall contract.223  The court of appeals 
reversed with respect to one of the contracts.224  In its holding, the 
court noted Sphere Drake had presented sufficient evidence that 
its agent did not have the authority to enter into the disputed 
contract.225  That evidence would show the contract was void, and 
would also put the entire contract, including the arbitration 
provision, “in sufficient issue as to warrant a trial on the question 
whether the arbitration clause in the [disputed] contract is 
enforceable.”226 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Has Taken the Proper Stance on Prima 
Paint with the Onvoy Decision 
In addressing the fundamental question of contract formation, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court properly distinguished the issue in 
Onvoy from the issue in Prima Paint.  In the Prima Paint decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court operated from the presumption that an 
agreement already existed.227  By contrast, the Onvoy court took a 
step back and looked at the formation of the agreement itself.228 
Prima Paint focused on fraud in the inducement of the 
contract.229  The Supreme Court reasoned that because the 
underlying contract was in question, not the validity of the 
arbitration provision contained in the agreement, the arbitration 
clause should govern in resolving the contract dispute.230  In 
reaching this decision, the Court determined the arbitration clause 
was severable from the rest of the contract.231  Unless the 
arbitration clause itself was challenged, an arbitrator, not a court, 
 
 222. Id. at 28, 32. 
 223. Id. at 29. 
 224. Id. at 34. 
 225. Id. at 33. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401-02 
(1967). 
 228. Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 352 (Minn. 2003). 
 229. 388 U.S. at 398. 
 230. Id. at 403-04. 
 231. Id. 
25
Johnson: Case Note: Contracts—Into the Void: Minnesota Limits Application
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
JOHNSON(CB & CKI).DOC 11/14/2004  6:05:34 PM 
604 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
would resolve any disputes arising under the agreement.232 
As a general principle of contract, a claim of fraud in the 
inducement makes an existing agreement voidable, not void.233  If a 
contract is voidable, the aggrieved party can rescind at his or her 
discretion.234  Under Prima Paint, recission of the contract itself 
would leave the uncontested arbitration clause intact and 
controlling over any disputes.235 
Conversely, Onvoy presents a different fact situation.  Onvoy 
argued it could not be bound by the arbitration provision because 
the underlying lease containing the provision was void.236  A void 
contract is an agreement with no legal effect.237  Consequently, any 
provision contained in the agreement, including an arbitration 
clause, would also have no effect.238  Accordingly, even if the parties 
initially intended to arbitrate, that intention would be based on a 
valid (i.e., not void from inception) agreement to arbitrate.239  
Armed with this distinction, the court sought guidance from other 
jurisdictions.  Notwithstanding broad arbitration clauses, several 
federal circuits have allowed disputes to proceed to trial if the 
plaintiff claims the original agreement is void.240  Specifically, the 
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, with their decisions in Sphere 
Drake, Sandvik, and Three Valleys, respectively, all support the 
position that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate under a 
disputed contract containing an arbitration provision.241  The court 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.22 (rev. ed. 2002). 
 234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 134, at cmt. b. 
 235. See 388 U.S. at 403-04. 
 236. Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 352, 354 (Minn. 2003). 
 237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 134, at cmt. a. 
 238. As one prominent legal scholar noted, “[i]f a contract includes an 
arbitration agreement, and grounds exist to revoke the entire contract, those 
grounds would also vitiate the arbitration agreement.”  RICHARD A. LORD, 21 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:14 (4th ed. 2001); see also 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION § 11:2 (West Group rev. ed., 2002) (“[A] valid arbitration agreement 
cannot arise out of a broader contract if no broader contract ever existed.”). 
 239. The Onvoy court held “allowing courts to retain jurisdiction over credible 
claims that a contract is void, leaves room for [parties] to escape obvious abuses of 
power in contracting.”  669 N.W.2d at 352. 
 240. See cases cited infra note 241. 
 241. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 26, 32 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (if one party to a contract alleges the contract is void and can establish 
evidence supporting that position, then that party “need not specifically allege that 
the arbitration clause in that contract is void, and the party is entitled to a trial on 
the arbitrability issue . . . .”);  Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107-08 
(3d Cir. 2000) (stating that the non-existence of an underlying contract means a 
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found this rationale persuasive and adopted its holding based on 
those circuits’ decisions.242 
The ruling in Onvoy fits well with Minnesota’s judicial 
principles.  On the one hand, the strong presumption in favor of 
arbitration is retained.243  Onvoy will be compelled to arbitrate if, 
on remand, the district court finds the actions of the SHAL 
defendants did not constitute an interested-director transaction 
and thus did not render the lease void.244  On the other hand, as 
Justice Paul Anderson’s concurrence points out, the Onvoy decision 
reflects the court’s strong belief in the right of access to the judicial 
system.245  Here, because the parties disputed the very existence of 
the lease (and by extension, the arbitration clause contained in the 
lease), the supreme court properly held the district court should 
resolve the issue of contract formation.246 
The Gilbert concurrence also acknowledges the Minnesota 
view of a balance between the role of the courts and the use of 
arbitration.247  However, Justice Gilbert also urges caution toward 
 
valid arbitration provision does not exist; accordingly, “no arbitration may be 
compelled in the absence of a [valid] agreement to arbitrate.”); Three Valleys 
Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 1991) (a 
party challenging the “making of a contract containing an arbitration provision 
cannot be compelled to arbitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an 
agreement to arbitrate.”).  Contra cases cited supra note 164. 
 242. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 353-54.  The Onvoy court also examined other cases 
where courts have jurisdiction when one party disputes the existence of a contract.  
Id.  In Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., a securities trading company tried to 
compel arbitration under a customer agreement.  957 F.2d 851, 853 (11th Cir. 
1992).  The account holder claimed no agreement existed because she had never 
signed a contract with the securities company.  Id.  The court held the facts of the 
case were sufficient to put the making of the arbitration agreement at issue, which 
therefore required court involvement “to determine the validity of the customer 
agreements before compelling [plaintiff] to submit her securities claims to 
arbitration.”  Id. at 855.  The Eighth Circuit considered a similar issue in I.S. Joseph 
Co. v. Mich. Sugar Co.  803 F.2d 396 (1986).  A disagreement arose over whether 
one party to a commercial contract could be compelled to arbitrate with an 
assignee who was not the original party who agreed to arbitrate.  Id. at 398-99.  The 
court of appeals held the question of the existence of a contract between the 
parties must be decided by the district court, and remanded for a ruling on that 
issue.  Id. at 400. 
 243. See sources cited supra note 20. 
 244. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 356. 
 245. Id. at 358-59 (“[W]hen a right as fundamental as the right of access to the 
courts and trial by jury is at stake, waiver of that right is not to be lightly 
presumed.”) (Anderson, Paul, J., concurring).   
 246. 21 LORD, supra note 238, § 57:14. 
 247. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 359 (Gilbert, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
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the use of ADR in general.  The impartiality of mediators and 
arbitrators is often suspect, due to their close ties to the industries 
they serve.248  Additionally, arbitration decisions are not required to 
conform with the existing rule of law.249  To address these issues, 
and in support of the supreme court’s overriding view of the 
primacy of the judiciary, Justice Gilbert recommends evaluation of 
both the state and federal arbitration systems “so that they may 
carry the same integrity that we require from our courts.”250 
All in all, the impact of Onvoy should not be overwhelming on 
the courts.  Unless a major flaw in contract formation is alleged, 
most disputes will probably proceed to arbitration as agreed.  
However, the court did consider the possible effects of this 
decision, and offered guidance for those entering into future 
arbitration agreements.  If the parties desire jurisdiction of a court 
rather than an arbitrator on specific issues, they should expressly 
state that intention in the contract.251  That way, in the event of a 
dispute, additional disagreements can be minimized. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A number of jurisdictions now limit the application of Prima 
Paint when a conflict arises over contract formation.252  With the 
Onvoy decision, Minnesota has joined these ranks.  The reasoning 
behind this movement is solid and sounds in the very foundations 
of contract law: how can an arbitration provision be enforced if it’s 
part of an agreement that may not exist?253  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court recognized this question, and provided a balanced 
solution in Onvoy.  Arbitration is a significant part of the business 
landscape in Minnesota, but enforcement of arbitration provisions 
under all circumstances does not apply.  Going forward from 
Onvoy, parties can expect their day in court if their contract dispute 





 248. Id. at 360. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 359. 
 251. Id. at 352. 
 252. See cases cited supra note 241. 
 253. See sources cited supra note 238. 
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